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chapter thirty

Licensing & Law
Who Owns an Avatar?
tyler t . ochoa

& jaime banks

Leeroy Jenkins is a videogame character of wide internet and gamer culture fame.
He first came to popular attention in 2005, in an iconic game scenario in which—
while his cohort was diligently planning a complex dungeon battle—he suddenly
sprang to life, let out the gravelly battle cry Ah’Leeerooooooy Ah’Jeeennnkiiinnns!, and
led his compatriots into a slaughter by dragon whelps. He subsequently noted: “At
least I have chicken” (DBlow2003, 2005/2014). The ridiculousness of this event
led first to the viral appropriation of the character—crafted into memes about
everything from riots and warfare to politics and cinema—and this broader reception led to an increased presence in other videogames and game-related products,
from the digital card deck-building game Hearthstone (2014) to third-party t-shirts
and allusions in films like Wreck-It Ralph (Spencer & Moore, 2012). While it’s not
uncommon for game companies to carry characters from one property to another
(e.g., the host of characters imported into Super Smash Bros. [1999]), Leeroy’s case
is different. He wasn’t created by a game company. He was created by a player, Ben
Schulz, as he played the MMO World of Warcraft (WoW; 2004).
As outlined in various chapters in this volume, both players and game developers have great influence over how avatars—via their assembled components—
manifest in digital gameplay. Developers craft their foundational platforms and
draw on those infrastructures to craft dynamic code that enables movements,
appearances, and abilities. But those potentials call into question whether avatars
are avatars until they are played—players click avatars into being, customize their
bodies and attire, drive their actions and interactions, and sometimes bring them
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outside the gameworld through physical representations. So, given avatars’ joint
reliance on developers and players, and given legal frameworks such as copyright
law, who really “owns” a videogame avatar?
The answer was, perhaps, simpler at one point than it is now. Although early
games offered little to no customization based on variations in rudimentary pixel
combinations, many modern games afford players a range of creative potential, especially in the MMO genre. These more advanced systems generally offer customization along four dimensions: visual appearance (shape and features of the body;
see chapters by Ahn, Nowak, Robinson, & Calvo, this volume), abilities (types of
spells and strengths; see chapters by Paul & Milik, this volume), behavior (action of
the avatar in the gameworld; see Popak, this volume), and dialogue (aural or textual
speech conveyed as or by the avatar; see Wirman & Jones, this volume). Although
the latter two dimensions are largely governed by the investment of the player (to the
extent the player offers inputs to the avatar to engender its movement or speech),
the former two dimensions are effectively governed by the game’s designers, as the
technical features offer the “raw ingredients” for players to use in customization
play. These constraints, however, still often function only as a framework for players’ engagement of the system. Take, for instance, the MMO City of Heroes (2004).
In creating an avatar, users select a character archetype (hero or villain), an origin
(e.g., mutant or magic), a primary and secondary power set, and a visual appearance varying by sex, body type, physique features, head (15 types with 26 features),
skin color, gear and ornamentation, weapons, auras, animations, name, voice, and
backstory. Accounting for all possible variations of these factors, players could quite
literally craft trillions of unique character forms (see Ochoa, 2012). Because the
game’s potentials don’t account for the unique contributions of players to how an
avatar “lives” in a gameworld through enacted avatar behaviors and speech, a question emerges as to whether players’ contributions to avatars as customized content
warrant some or all of the legal rights associated with authorship and ownership.
t h e l i m i t e d lo g i c o f l i c e n s e a g r e e m e n t s
In addressing this question, the first consideration is a given game’s End-User
License Agreement (EULA) or Terms of Use (ToU), which define a game developer’s or publisher’s ownership of the game code and of the copyrightable expressions that players may produce during gameplay. For instance, the WoW ToU
states that “All rights and title in and to the Service (including without limitation any user accounts, titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, character
names, stories, dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations,
sounds, musical compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral
rights, any related documentation, ‘applets,’ transcripts of the chat rooms, character

licensing

&

l aw

| 293

profile information, recordings of games) are owned by Blizzard or its licensors”
(Blizzard, 2012, para. 4). Many developers require players to agree to a EULA
before they are permitted to access game content, to protect the company’s interests associated with original and derivative game content.
While such agreements may seem cut and dried, EULAs do not offer a definitive
answer to the question of avatar ownership. For instance, even if a player consents,
a EULA may be unenforceable or invalid if a court considers it unconscionable,
a violation of public policy, or preempted by federal copyright law (see Lemley,
1999). Certain attributes of authorship and ownership cannot be assigned via contract (e.g., termination rights, see Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 2002). Moreover,
“reliance on a EULA is intellectually unsatisfying and logically backwards”—
in considering ownership, it is more prudent to consider “who owns what in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary” (Ochoa, 2012, p. 965). This approach
allows default ownership to be determined and, from that baseline, one can consider the validity and enforceability of contractual alterations to the default. Who,
then, owns an avatar when there is no agreement to the contrary?
c o p y r i g h t a n d avata r s a s

“works”

The issue of default avatar ownership comes in its potential status as a copyrightable “work of authorship,” and the extent to which developer and player creatively
contribute to that authorship. “Copyright protection subsists … in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” (Copyright Act of 1976,
§ 102(a)). Original denotes that a work is independently created and contains a
minimal (even slight) amount of creativity (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991). Copyright protection for original works, however, is limited to the unique expression of an idea and not the idea itself (Copyright Act, §
102(b)). For instance, the layout of controls for a golf videogame (e.g., on-screen
arrows and ball flight path) are driven by minimal necessary functions and so are
not sufficiently creative or original (Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc., 2005). While early games did not exhibit a great deal of creativity, often
relying on simple geometric shapes with predictable movement (e.g., Pong, 1972),
modern games arguably afford a much greater array of creative potential.
A work is fixed “when its embodiment in a copy [a material object such as
a computer disk] … is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration” (Copyright Act, § 101). Although computer code driving a game’s
audiovisual outputs is considered fixed in a permanent form (cf. Stern Electronics,
Inc. v. Kaufman, 1982), one must consider whether the audiovisual outputs themselves are fixed. Because—in addition to the appearance and visibility dimensions
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of customization—players can manipulate avatars as on-screen content toward
highly variable behavior and speech, these aspects of avatars arguably are crafted
in real time and so are not fixed in this fashion. “That makes playing a videogame
a little like arranging words in a dictionary into sentences or paints on a palette
into a painting. The question is whether the creative effort in playing a videogame
is enough like writing or painting to make each performance of a videogame the
work of the player and not the game’s inventor” (Midway Manufacturing Co. v.
Arctic Intl. Inc., 1983). Courts’ early answers to this question relied on early games’
repetitive nature, such that one could ostensibly replicate a player-created display
by performing the same movements (Ochoa, 2012). As games have become more
complex, more reliant on random events, and multiplayer-driven, however, this
conclusion regarding fixation becomes less persuasive; on-screen events are perhaps more akin to live, improvised performances, which are not considered “fixed”
unless they are simultaneously being recorded (Copyright Act, § 101).
Finally, the Copyright Act lists eight kinds of works of authorship—literary, dramatic, musical, pantomime/choreographic, pictorial/graphic/sculptural, audiovisual,
sound recordings, and architectural (§ 102(a)). Videogames fit into two of these
categories, as they comprise computer code (a copyrightable literary work) and that
code, when run, generates audiovisual output. Despite this duality, Copyright Office
regulations provide that a game need only be registered as one of these two types to
protect both the code and its output (U.S. Copyright Office, 2014, § 721.10(A)).
In considering default ownership of avatars, one must also determine whether
or not an avatar is a separate work of authorship, apart from its game. The Copyright Act fails to provide a definition of “work,” but one can draw an analogy to a
literary or graphic character that is protected by copyright if it features identifiable,
persistent traits that make it original and distinctive (e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane,
2004). Although many graphic media characters meet this criterion quite easily, it
is nonetheless difficult to determine whether an avatar constitutes a work distinct
from the game in which it is embedded. In implementing the “minimum size principle” (Hughes, 2005, p. 609), however, the Copyright Office forbids registration
of words or short phrases (U.S. Copyright Office, 2014, § 313.4(C)), but it allows
registration of literary, dramatic, or visual works that describe or depict a character
(U.S. Copyright Office, 2014, §§ 911, 912). Therefore, an audiovisual work that
features an avatar’s distinctive appearance and attributes could be copyrighted, and
that copyright would protect that avatar as an aspect of the work.
Assuming an avatar qualifies as a “work of authorship,” is it fixed? While discrete, coded visual properties and algorithms that underlie avatars’ abilities may be
considered fixed by virtue of their permanent storage on a material object such as a
hard drive (a game provider’s or a player’s), the dynamic features of an avatar (i.e.,
the enactment of those abilities, and behaviors and speech) may be too fleeting
or fluid to be deemed fixed. Indeed, because of this fluidity, the engagement and
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conveyance of these potentials may be considered a public performance, the live
transmission of which can be fixed if it is permanently recorded (e.g., via machinima recordings; Copyright Act, § 101).
As to whether an avatar is original, it must be (a) distinctive and detailed
enough to be distinguished from generic, similar characters, which are treated as
unprotectable ideas (Gaiman v. McFarlane, 2004) and (b) sufficiently different
from previous copyrightable characters, unless the derivative character was created
with authorization (Copyright Act, § 103(a)). It must be acknowledged that many
avatars (say, in an MMO where avatars are often quite similar) are not sufficiently
different from preexisting characters and not distinct from avatarial tropes in a
given game. Nonetheless, it is likely that some (perhaps many) user-crafted avatars are imbued with the minimal “creative spark” required for originality (cf. Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991).
But who is the font of this creativity—who is the creative author? From a
deterministic perspective, a game developer may claim to be the author, because
the avatar cannot be anything that the game’s designers and programmers do not
allow it to be. This view, however, overlooks the fact that the avatar is much more
than just code—the program constrains but does not dictate the avatar’s customizable expressions. Depending on the degree to which players can influence the form
and function of on-screen content (Steuer, 1992), games necessarily give players some degree of freedom that may warrant copyrightable authorship in avatar
appearance and behavior within the program’s constraints. If a game offers a sufficient range of interactivity and player choice such that the productive gameplay
can no longer be said to be solely authored by the developer, the player must be
considered to have some degree of original authorship (Ochoa, 2012). By analogy,
a word-processing program or paint program is copyrightable, but the literary and
artistic works produced with those tools are not owned by the program’s copyright
holder (Berkla v. Corel Corp, 1999). Thus, in a game that offers only a limited range
of customization options and limited interactivity (e.g., moving left or right and
jumping only), the developer could be said to be the sole author of any avatars,
since any player customization is limited and all avatars are derivative of the basic
template. However, given that most games today afford a wide range of options
for avatar customization by appearance, abilities, behavior, and speech, it cannot
be said that a game developer is the sole author of such an avatar—at a minimum,
the player must be considered a joint author of the avatar.
o n j o i n t au t h o r s h i p a n d ow n e r s h i p
Let us return now to the question of who owns an avatar. The Copyright Act
accounts for four types of collaborative authorship: works of joint authorship,
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derivative works as successive authorship, works made for hire, and collective
works (§§ 101, 103, 201). These forms of authorship depend on the relationship
among collaborators and on the nature of their contributions, and these forms
in turn determine ownership. Notably, however, none of these four frameworks
account for the collaborative dynamics between MMO developers and players.
While it is beyond the scope of this short chapter to delve into the nuances of fit
(for this, see Ochoa, 2012), suffice it to say that each disadvantages one or both
parties without fully addressing the contributions of both.
Given a choice of four imperfect options, an MMO is perhaps best considered a collective work (an option that provides some protection to both player and
developer contributions), and individual avatars perhaps are best viewed as separately copyrightable contributions to that collective work (because many games
afford customization systems requiring considerable player creativity). If so, it
must still be determined who owns the copyright to those avatars as contributions.
Should a specific avatar be counted as a joint work of the game provider (providing
the template) and the player (fleshing out that template)?
It may be useful to consider each avatar as a compilation—a work in which
“preexisting materials … are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship” (Copyright Act, § 101). An avatar can be viewed as a selection and arrangement of
components provided by the game developer, in which case the player would be
considered the author through his or her lawful selection and arrangement and may
claim copyright (Copyright Act, § 201(c)). Thus, the game developer owns the
program and audiovisual content copyrights (created by employee-programmers
as work made for hire), while the program delivers to players the raw materials for
avatar creation. A player selects from these materials, arranging them in an original, creative way to form an avatar (a compilation) that is then contributed to the
MMO (a collective work). Viewed in this way, developers would enjoy a default
statutory privilege to use the avatar in certain ways, but players could arguably
enforce their avatar copyrights outside of the game.
t h e va lu e a n d f u t u r e o f avata r o w n e r s h i p
The previous discussion begs a question: should copyright law provide rights to
players? Consider the question in light of the two principal rationales for copyright
protection: the utilitarian model (predominant in common-law countries) and the
natural-rights model (predominant in civil-law countries). On one hand, the utilitarian perspective posits that copyright exists to benefit the public by encouraging
(through rights and economic protections) the creation and distribution of new
literary and artistic works (e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
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1985). Copyrights and patents may be granted to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I,
§ 8, cl.8). This view suggests that only game developers should be owners of avatars, since the creation of MMOs is the type of capital-intensive endeavor which
most heavily relies on the financial incentive provided by copyright ownership. The
game engine, the character-creation system, and the avatar’s integration with the
gameworld all require significant investment to create. Developers often rely on
monetization of these properties through other media forms to cover development
and maintenance costs, and the development of such derivative works could be
inhibited if players could assert copyright claims to avatars. Conversely, players do
not require monetary incentives to create avatars—they do it for entertainment,
and often pay for the right to do it.
On the other hand, the natural-rights perspective suggests that one has a natural right to profit from the products of one’s artistic labors (Locke, 1690). In this
vein, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that “[e]veryone
has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author”
(Article 27). From this perspective, players should indeed own their avatars, as
they have invested time, money, and creative effort into the avatar through customization and gameplay, and so deserve to be compensated if that investment is
exploited by another. In other words, it would be unfair for game companies to
benefit from player labor without compensation. In tandem, however, both perspectives advise against considering MMOs as joint works and avatars as derivative works, because these framings would not accurately reflect both companies’
and individuals interests and would disrupt commercial dealings relative to those
interests. Instead, each avatar should be considered a joint work (jointly owned by
the player and the game provider) that is a contribution to a collective work, the
MMO (Ochoa, 2012). The fact that this proposed solution is an imperfect fit,
however, highlights how the theoretical and practical dimensions of interactive
media content ownership are not easily and neatly aligned.
It is likely that as videogame play and other forms of interactive media use
become more complex—through technological advances like virtual reality, social
evolutions such as user literacies, and industry shifts toward specific content and
sales models—so too will issues of authorship and ownership become more complex. For instance, as game programming becomes a mainstream skill set, how does
one parse out the integration of platform-delivered code with player-created code,
as with the complex compilations of game-native and user-crafted items composing avatars in Second Life (2003) and High Fidelity (2013)? And how might we
untangle authorship and ownership of fixed works like Twitch gameplay streams,
that draw on content from game companies, engaged creatively by players, but

298

|

t yler t . och oa

&

jaime banks

are fixed by streaming companies? And might avatars themselves at some point
deserve authorship credit, given impending advances in artificial intelligence?
These and other unexpected collaborative authorship and ownership dilemmas
will undoubtedly arise, requiring both theoretical and practical evaluations of these
dynamics in ways that protect the interests of players, developers, and avatars alike.
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